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Abstract: Phillips and colleagues convincingly argue that knowledge attribution is a faster, more 
automatic form of mindreading than belief attribution. However, they do not explain what it is about 
knowledge attribution that lends it this cognitive advantage. I suggest an explanation of the knowledge-
attribution advantage that would also help to distinguish it from belief-based and minimalist 
alternatives.  
One of the key claims of the target article is that reasoning about states of knowledge is faster and more 
automatic than reasoning about states of belief. While Phillips and colleagues provide a range of 
evidence to support this claim, they do not explain what it is about knowledge attribution that makes it 
more efficient than belief attribution. Filling in these details will be crucial to explaining how knowledge 
attribution actually works and would also help to distinguish the proposed framework from nearby 
alternatives.  
One way for the authors to explain the knowledge-attribution advantage would be to adopt a minimalist 
approach, and suggest that knowledge-based mindreading deploys representations of non-propositional 
relations that hold between agents and states of affairs – something analogous to Burge’s notion of 
sensing (Burge, 2018) or Butterfill and Apperly’s notion of a registration (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013). 
However, as proponents of these minimalist models have been careful to point out, this kind of 
mindreading does not actually enable agents to reason about propositional attitudes; rather, they 
enable agents to track mental states like belief without representing them as such. Since knowledge is 
also a propositional attitude, this means that minimal mindreading could not support genuine 
knowledge attribution. At most, it would enable an agent to extensionally track factive states without 
representing them as knowledge. If the account described in the target article aims for more than this, 
then a minimalist approach will not do. 
A better approach to explaining the knowledge-attribution advantage would be to start by looking at the 
processing demands stemming false-belief attribution, the paradigmatic example of propositional 
attitude reasoning. Famously, false-belief attribution requires mindreaders to generate and maintain 
two mutually inconsistent, decoupled representations of the world, which places inherent demands 
executive functions like working memory and inhibitory control (Fizke et al., 2014; Schuwerk et al., 
2014). If knowledge attribution involved a similar decoupling process, albeit one where the attributed 
representation is consistent with the mindreader’s own primary, first-personal representation, then this 
might explain the knowledge-attribution advantage: while it involves the attribution of full-blown 
propositional attitudes, the contents of knowledge attributions do not conflict with the way the 
mindreader sees the world, which places fewer demands on their executive resources. However, this 
picture sounds perilously close to how one might describe true-belief attribution. If the knowledge-
attribution advantage were due solely to this consistency in attributed contents, then it would seem 
that the entire model could be easily redescribed in non-factive, doxastic terms without any real loss in 
explanatory power.  
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Careful to distinguish their model from such non-factive alternatives, Phillips and colleagues point to 
evidence showing that mindreading in Gettier-like cases where an agent has true beliefs but not 
knowledge is actually quite difficult, both for children and for nonhuman primates (Fabricius et al., 2010; 
Horschler et al., 2019). These data indicate that reasoning about mere true belief is surprisingly 
inefficient, despite the fact that it does not require agents to generate inconsistent representations of 
the world. Thus, whatever it is that explains the knowledge-attribution advantage, it is not its similarity 
to mere true-belief attribution. But while this response provides support for the knowledge-attribution 
framework, it does not bring us any closer to answering our central question. Instead, we are left with a 
new puzzle: what makes knowledge attribution different from true-belief attribution? 
Here, we must consider the different cognitive demands that arise when reasoning about the mind of a 
knower and the mind of a mere true believer. While both forms of mindreading involve attributing a 
mental state that matches reality, the way that the mindreader must represent the link between that 
mental state and the world is not the same in the two cases. The representations that we attribute to 
the knower are securely bound to the contents of our own primary representations of the world. This is 
most obvious in cases of shared knowledge – for example, when two people both have unobstructed 
perceptual access to the same event. From such a shared epistemic position, maintaining a model of 
another agent’s mind is easy, because updates to our own primary representations of the world 
seamlessly carry over to our knowledge attributions. This is much different than the kind of decoupling 
involved in false-belief reasoning, where we must actively quarantine off our representations of the 
other agent’s mental states so that they can be updated separately. In knowledge attribution, in 
contrast, representations of the knower’s mental states are tightly coupled with our own primary 
representations (Westra & Nagel, under review).  
In the case of the mere true believer, the link between mind and the world is much less secure. Although 
the contents we attribute in this case happen to align with the way we take the world to be, the 
weakness of their epistemic position means that the possibility of misalignment lurks nearby. In this 
sense, the mere true believer is not so different from the false believer: both kinds of case demand a 
kind of epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010), an alertness to the potential for error that is 
unnecessary in ordinary cases of knowledge-attribution (Nagel, 2019). It is thus unsurprising that 
reasoning about mere true beliefs appears to be so cognitively demanding, since it requires a level of 
decoupling between mind and world similar to what we see in false-belief attribution.  
One prediction that follows from this analysis is that whenever knowledge attributions do require 
heightened levels of epistemic vigilance, they will not be much more efficient than the corresponding 
belief attributions. One context where this might occur would be in Frege cases, where we must treat an 
agent as having knowledge of a referent under one mode of presentation but not under another – for 
example, when we represent Lois Lane as knowing that Superman flies, but not as knowing that Clark 
Kent flies (c.f. Rakoczy et al., 2015). In these cases, the processing demands (and hence, the speed) of 
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